U.S. Policies towards Okinawa since 1850 and Their Significance

After the Second World War, America allowed scores of its occupations and territories abroad to attain independence for instance the Philippines (1946), the Marshal Islands (1986), the Federated States of Micronesia (1986) and Palau (1994). However, some of Americas former colonies, Puerto Rico and Guam, remain under Americas control devoid of the benefits and rights of statehood. Furthermore, of those former possessions that attained independence, majority of them continue to contain America bases in their territories, at times in spite of the local views, as it is with the case of Okinawa, the largest island of Japans Ryukyu Islands and islets (Smith 64).

By 2003, U.S had military bases in more than 36 nations worldwide including Okinawa (U.S department of defense).  In the early 1850s, Japan was under the supremacy of Tugawa shogunate, which came into power in 1603. This type of government did not allow any commercial contact with any Western countries except for the Netherlands and China, who were allowed to conduct remote trading. Shockingly in 1853, Japan experienced the arrival of a U.S expedition guided by Commodore Mathew Calbraith Perry, to deliver a letter to the Emperor requesting for commercial relations (Nichols 9). Thereafter, Perry got an invitation from the Emperor for extended talks on the trade relation issue. In 1854 when Perry returned, his request was denied. He made threats and planned to capture the Okinawa Island so as to use it as its base. They therefore agreed and signed the treaty of Kanagawa, which enabled the U.S to use the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate. According to the treaty, American ships could take coal, food and water in addition to stationing a U.S. consul general at Shimoda. In 1858 the Shogunenate officials signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Harris Treaty) even before they obtained from the Imperial Court (Kerr 76). This treaty enabled the US to access 5 ports for trade. Furthermore, this treaty prevented Japan from trying foreigners for crimes committed in Japan let alone the deprivation of Japan to impose duties on imported goods (Kerr).

In the 1880s, Japan overthrew the king, founded a garrison on the Island, and officially made Okinawa a prefecture. Over the years, the interests of Japan within Asia grew, highlighting the importance of Okinawa as a base of its protection from its southern littoral invasion. This importance was evident in the final year of the Second World War, when the Allied Forces in the Pacific decided to lock Okinawa, 340 miles from Japan, as the ultimate staging area to be used to invade Japan (Nichols 12).

This resulted in the Battle of Okinawa, a 3-month long operation, with devastating results. Before the joint invasion in 1945, the natives of Okinawa unwillingly supported the immense defensive preparations for the Japanese Armys ultimate position. In turn they suffered tremendous fatalities in the actual attack and succeeding battle. Information from several sources approximates a range of 60,000 to over 100,000 fatalities in the 3- month battle. These mainly comprised of the non-combatants, entrapped between a proceeding US force and the receding Okinawa force (French 3). Some of the most horrifying accounts include killing of children and women by Japanese soldiers so that they did not surrender their place in caves and forcing of thousands of Okinawans to jump to their deaths from the sea cliffs on the southern tip of the island (Masahide).  The military fatalities included over 50,000 for the American military and more than 107,000 for Okinawan and Japanese conscripts. Approximately one- fourth to one-third of the population of Okinawa was killed in the battle. In addition, massive equipment losses were recorded with allies losing 763 aircrafts and 34 ships and damaging 368 from attacks. On the other hand, the Japanese lost 16 combat ships and 7,830 aircrafts. This excludes the battleship Yamato which sunk even before arrive at Okinawa, alongside 7 extra combat ships send out from mainland Japan to escort her. Strangely, the Yamato was sent out from the mainland with precisely enough fuel to Okinawa, for her duty was to dock at the beach and battle until destroyed. This therefore portrays the battle of Okinawa as the most bloodiest and costly fight of the Pacific Theater (Pike).

After the battle, Okinawa was under the American administration for approximately 27 years within which the USAF established many military bases. Thereafter, the U.S military deployed security forces throughout Japan. With the start of the Korean War (1950-53), the Japanese new role in Asia was a repair facility for US forces and frontward deployment centre (Davis and Robert). This implies that Okinawas role changed from an occupation mission to an onward base logistical focal point and theater stern area for power projection. Additionally, Okinawa served as a authorized area for US forces throughout the Vietnam War, Dessert StormDessert Shield and the most recent East Tumor (French 4).

The precise details concerning the deposition and size of the American forces are tackled under different administrative treaties between Japan and the US. Article III of the 1951 Security treaty set the foundation for future deployments (Security Treaty). In reality, Okinawa which accounts for less than 1 of Japans land plays hosts to two-thirds of the 40,000 American forces in the nation, with two main bases, Kadena Air Base and Marine Corps Air Station situated near residential locale. It may astonish some people to note that this number of US military personnel in fact exceeds the number of workforce on the Korean isthmus (Nichols 16).

In 1972, America returned Okinawa to the Japanese administration after signing of the Treaties of Peace and Security in September of 1951. A US Military Governor General sustained his rule on Okinawa after the 1951 treaty until the official reversion to the Japanese administration. Since 1972 to date, the US military personnel carry on with deployment of more security forces through the aforementioned security treaty. This treaty was later updated in 1997 and reaffirmed by the George Bush administration when the American State Department made public a joint statement by Japans Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush (US Department of State). The statement summarized the general concept of future-presence of militants in Japan (Kerr 34).

The US considers Okinawa important for security in Asia as it is strategically situated, with the capability of sustaining large military operations in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Okinawa is position and located at the convergence of the Pacific Ocean and the East China Sea. It is from this area that the US military forces able to counter unforeseen threats in Korea and Southeast Asia. This area accounts for approximately a third of Americas trade (500billion excess per year) and 34 of the Gross World Product, in addition to hosting some of the leading world economies out of the USA including Korea, Japan and china and the worlds largest armed forces consisting of Russia, South Korea, Peoples Republic of China and North Korea (Nichols 16).

Furthermore, 5 of the 7 US common Defense Treaties are in the Asia-Pacific area.  Form an entirely military perspective, the operational capabilities provided at Naha Military Port, Kadena Air Force Base and White Beach Naval Facility in addition to strategic intelligence capabilities and vital strategic communication assets are some of the infrastructural resources fundamental to the operational triumph of the US forces in the area.

It is important to note that with the occurrence of all the events, there is a feeling of animosity between not only the Okinawans and Japanese government, but also to an underlying tension about founding the US military forces in the area. These significant tension complexes have been due to the unfortunate events over the years that the US military personnel have been based there.
According to the 2007 Okinawa Times Poll, 85 of Okinawans oppose the presence of the US military due to the aircraft accidents, environmental degradation, noise pollution from military drills and crimes committed by the American military personnel (Nichols 14).

On September 4, 1995, a sailor and 2 American marines kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old girl. At the time of the incident, Japanese police couldnt arrest the suspects because they had to remain in the US Military until convicted by the court, as per the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement. This led to the eruption of emotions of anti-military base and a procession of the largest protests in contemporary history. Finally, through political intervention, the former marines were tried and charged in 1996.
Thereafter, the Status of Force Agreement, which was condemned for being too defensive of US personnel involved in crimes, was revised. In November 1995, a faction named Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence was formed to increase awareness of crimes suspected to have been committed by American military staff on the island. This awareness was further inflamed by the Michael Brown Okinawa assault incident, where by a Marine Corps Major charged with attempted rape, was not handed over to the Japanese authorities on request. He was later prosecuted of a lesser charge of attempted indecent assault (Nichols 12).

Consequently after this incident, Okinawa authorities pushed for a modification of the Status of Forces Agreement in an effort to eliminate the militarys one-sided right to determine if it would release military personnel charge with a serious offence. Tensions piled even more after accusations of an assault committed by an American military employee against a minor. A restriction was thereafter obligatory to all US Status of Forces Agreement eligible personnel including military personnel at Okinawa and Iwakuni bases in February, 2008. This restriction has since been abolished.
In 2008, the American military incriminated a Marine with kidnapping through luring and raping a 14-year old girl in Okinawa. Sgt. Tyrone L. Hadnott pleaded guilty to the assault charge and was condemned with a dishonorable expulsion from the military and a 3 year prison sentence, but was cleared of the charges of kidnapping and rape. The girl declined to press charges thus Hadnott was not summoned by the Japanese prosecutors (Nichols 15). 

Furthermore, the international and local media are very aware of these occurrences but never pass a chance to leverage them in the current debate on the American Military existence on the island. In addition, there is minimal follow-up coverage of any judicial results when the military personnel or their relatives are reprimanded or charged for crimes they are guilty of. This kind of media attention persists even in America. It is also important to note that there is absolutely no counterbalance media coverage with consideration on the reaffirmation of the Americas military importance and their good deeds in the region. The episodes of individual misconduct are the most locally and internationally visible incidents but are surely solely responsible as the points of contention from the Okinawan.
Possibly, the main cause of debate is the specific number of US military personnel based in Okinawan compared to the rest of Japan. The Okinawans are also very knowledgeable of the imbalance of draw down and restructuring occurring in mainland Japan as opposed to their prefecture in addition to the considerable reductions in the US future presence in the Europe due to the conclusion of the Cold War. In the last 25 years, the US has returned approximately 15 of the land it occupied in Okinawa in comparison to the 60 of the assets it utilized on the Mainland (Bandow).
This implies that there is unequal distribution of land exploited to support US future deployed forces. It is for these issues that in 1995, the Japanese and US governments with the Okinawa Prefecture Government representatives founded a Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to tackle them. The SACO agreements and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) agreements were in four categories namely

Overall reduction of the locale used by American forces by about 20 through a series of elimination or consolidation of housing areas, training facilities and bases.
Adjustment to operational and training procedure so as to cause less public interference.
Initiation of noise reduction efforts, all of which dealt with flights from MCAS-Futenma and Kadena Air Force Base.

Improvement of the Status of Forces Agreement between Japan and US (Smith).
So far some strides have been made and information flow between Okinawans and the US military improved with the institutionalization of the Okinawa area council. This initiative had originally been started in 1960s, but collapsed over the years due to Okinawas reversion to the mainland Japan government. When it comes to the economic relations, there are no specific data on trade between Okinawa and the US but is included in the Okinawas data. 

US has been Okinawas largest economic partner, delivering 22.3 of its imports, receiving 31.5 of its exports and accounting for 45.9 of its direct investment overseas in 1990. As of 2004, the US delivers 14 of J Okinawas imports and receives 22.7 of its exports the disparity in trade exchanges having been picked up by China, which is providing 20. The general decline, and modest improvement in trade balance after the appreciation in value of the Yen 1985, has greatly contributed to the strained trade relations. Japan had resisted opening its market to the US since early 1960s soliciting for increased pressure through the 1970s and 1980s (Smith).

 The tensions resulted from issues immerging from particular industries perhaps more than the trade imbalances. This began with the textile in 1950s whereby Okinawas exports to America were subjected to denial from the US industry. These complaints led to unfair trading practices for instance dumping and patent infringement. The outcomes of any negotiations on the matter resulted in Okinawas agreement to voluntarily hold back exports to the US. Similar agreements affected a number of products such as colour television in 1970s and automobiles in the 1980s (Smith).
In 1970s and 1980s, American administration decided the issue-by issue technique in negotiating such economic disagreements with Japan. This technique was aimed at reducing the areas of disagreement. Instead it led to a widespread harmful publicity, at a period when altering security and economic circumstances were forcing both countries to reconsider their relationship.
Some innovative techniques surfaced in the 1980s as the US companies struggled to achieve greater entrance to Japanese market. MOSS negotiations in 1985 addressed these issues as pertaining to 4 industries namely medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, electronics, telecommunication services and equipment and forest products. In 1988 these trade disputes motivated the formulation of the United States Trade Act, which enabled the president to recognize unfair trading associates of the US and to clarify on the specific products for negotiation with these nations. In 1989, Japan was named an unfair partner in three areas telecommunication satellites, forest products and supercomputers and chosen for negotiations. This action exemplified the ongoing dissatisfaction mood over the entrance to Japanese markets by the conclusion of the decade. Nonetheless, the US and Japan solved their disagreements to Okinawas advantage (Nichols 13).

Concurrently, America initiated extensive talks concerning the structural dynamics inhibiting manufactured imports in Okinawa in the Structural Impediments initiative. These talks tackled weak antitrust law enforcement, high real estate prices, law restricting the growth of large discount store chains in Okinawa and land taxation that hindered efficient farming. Japan was still capable to accomplish most of its interests that expanded its economy even further (Nichols 18).
 The growth of Okinawas competition and the down turn of the world market share held by the in the US manufacturers, in addition to accusations of unfair trade practices, made semiconductors a controversial issue between Okinawa and United States throughout the 1980s. The accusations included incriminations of dumping in the US market and of import obstacles artificially restricting the market share of United States businesses selling in Japan. Discussions in 1986 led to  an agreement that resulted in an increase in Okinawas DRAM export prices and a provision aimed at increasing the US share of the Japanese market (from the 10  in 1986 to 20  by 1991). US objection that Japan refused to carry out the agreement resulted in retaliation the imposition of disciplinary 100  duty on US300 million of Japanese exports to the US (Davis). Proof of the rise in DRAMs export prices led to partial exclusion of the sanctions, while retaining others until compliance was observed in the rising of the US market share in Okinawa. This whole incident remained very contentious till the end of the decade, specifically the attainment of an acceptable market share for U S-made goods in Okinawa. Nonetheless, America hail Japanese technology but Okinawa had benefits over the US.  Okinawa was still able to deal with its price competitiveness in America, and the Okinawa market tactic by U.S. companies, did not flourish compared to domestic Okinawa manufacturers (Kerr 76).

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